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The New Baby Mama Drama: Equal Rights to Compensation for Birth Mothers of 
Adopted Infants as Granted to Egg Donors and Surrogates 
 
Jenny Beecroft 
 
Imagine a number of the common scenarios that take place in the various processes 
individuals go through in order to have a child. When a woman donates her eggs she is 
compensated, depending on a number of factors, anywhere from $5,000 to $100,000.
1 
When a 
woman is contracted to be a gestational surrogate, where she carries to term, either the couple’s 
egg and sperm, donor egg and sperm, or a combination of both, she is compensated up to 
$100,000.
2 
When a woman gives up her baby for adoption, she has in effect donated her egg to 
 
the prospective adoptive parents and served as a surrogate mother, and yet it is illegal to 
compensate her for her reproductive donation and service.
3
 
This paper will argue that the inequality present in the right to compensation for providing 
reproductive material and services should be abolished. Compensation is legal in Artificial 
Reproductive Technology (hereinafter, “ART”) and thus should also be legalized in adoption, 
because birth mothers who give up their infants for adoption, should not be less compensated 
when they are arguably giving up the same, if not more. Birth mothers who place their infants for 
adoption are making comparable sacrifices to women who participate in ART in the sense that 
they are providing their genetic egg to create the infant, and they are serving as a gestational 
surrogate since they carry the infant to term. However, birth mothers who place their infants for 
adoption are arguably giving up more as they are sacrificing their fundamental right to 
parent their child. Birth mothers who place their infants for adoption are providing strikingly 
 
 
 
1 Jennifer Adaeze Anyaegbunam, Ivy League women get offers for their eggs, CNN HEALTH (August 12th, 2009), 
http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2009/08/12/ivy-league-women-get-offers-for-their-eggs/. 
2 Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, With Few Ground Rules, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (December 12, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?pagewanted=2&ref=assistedreproductivetech nology. 
3 Andrea B. Carroll, Reregulating the Baby Market: A Call for A Ban on Payment of Birth-Mother Living 
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Expenses, 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 285, 287 (2011). 
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comparable reproductive donations and services as the women who participate in ART and yet 
are treated unequally under the current law in the United States, where no state allows 
compensation for adoption.
4
 
Many scholars have proffered the viewpoint of “parental rights selling”5 instead of “baby 
 
selling.” This paper is not proposing that individuals should be compensated for selling their 
parental rights or for selling their babies. Instead, this paper proposes that birth mothers who 
place their infants for adoption should be compensated for donating their eggs, as their genetic 
material was used to create the fetus, and for serving as surrogates by carrying the fetus to term, 
just as any other egg donor and/or gestational surrogate would be compensated. When birth 
mothers of adopted infants are arguably giving up so much more then egg donors and gestational 
surrogates, it is irrational that they should not receive at least an equal benefit for their sacrifice. 
This paper will argue that compensating birth mothers is both logical and equitable by 
examining present methods of compensation under the current legal system, drawing 
comparisons to ART and “parental rights selling,” and establishing a framework of limitations 
that will reflect acknowledgment of the inherent risks involved and an effort to eliminate such 
risks. The first section will illustrate how the exchange of compensation in order to have a child 
is already taking place. The exchange of compensation occurs illegally in agency adoption and 
private adoption, and legally in egg and sperm donations, and surrogacy. This is not for the 
purpose of opposing or condoning any of the current legal processes but to proffer that because 
compensation for adoption is currently taking place illegally, the cons, risks, and dangers 
provided by opponents are not entirely relevant to a hypothetical framework where such 
compensation would be legal and thus regulated with safeguards in place that will prevent many 
 
 
 
4 Carroll, Reregulating the Baby Market: A Call for A Ban on Payment of Birth-Mother Living Expenses, at 287. 
5 Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 61 (1987). 
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of the risks and dangers of the illegal market. This section will also illustrate the harsh inequity 
 
in the current ban on compensation for adoption by highlighting the unmistakable comparison of 
the sacrifice birth mothers of adopted infants endure to the donations and services of women who 
participate in ART, and legally receive compensation for their donations and services. 
The second section analyzes current theories supporting “parental rights selling” and pits 
these theories against their opponent’s arguments in order to demonstrate the pros and cons of 
both points of view. This analysis will show how the risks and dangers present in “parental rights 
selling” far outweigh any benefits that could result, and thus, theories of “parental rights selling” 
are insufficient to create an effective framework for legalized compensation for adoption. The 
purpose of this section is to distinguish the proposed framework of compensating birth mothers 
for their donation and services from “parental rights selling” theories to reveal how the purposed 
framework will be more feasible. It will demonstrate that the proposed system will not be 
plagued by the same risks present and inseparable from “parental rights selling,” and yet will still 
allow for the proffered benefits of “parental rights selling,” such as an increased availability of 
infants placed for adoption in a market where the demand is currently insurmountably greater 
then the supply. 
The third section suggests a framework for a legalized system for compensating birth 
mothers of adopted infants for their reproductive donations and services. This section 
exemplifies how a legalized system of compensations for adoption would extinguish the risks 
and dangers that are present in the current illegal system, because once legal, it is possible to 
regulate the exchange of compensation, thus allowing for the placement of necessary safeguards 
in order to protect all parties involved. These protections include recommendations for strict 
limitations that will act as necessary safeguards to abolish and prevent the risks and problems 
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discussed in the context of the current illegal system of compensation for adoption and “parental 
rights selling” theories. 
Such limitations include the requirements that both parties have separate and independent 
legal counsel, and that the birth mother participate in mandatory counseling by an independent 
counselor throughout her pregnancy, and at a minimum, weekly during her last trimester. The 
attorney and counselor for the birth mother must find that the mother has the requisite knowledge 
of all aspects of her decision and that the decision is completely voluntarily and not due to 
desperation for monetary compensation. A limitation on the age of the birth mother will not be 
necessary as the mandatory counseling would provide a sufficient safe guard to counter the risks 
inherent in immaturity. Eligibility for compensation will only be granted to birth mothers who 
relinquish their infants before being released from the hospital, because to allow compensation 
when the child is any older risks crossing the line into selling human beings versus 
accomplishing the purposed framework’s objective of compensating birth mothers for their 
reproductive donation and services. 
Finally, this paper will conclude that birth mothers of adoptive infants deserve an equal 
right to compensation as women who participate in ART, while recognizing the risks and 
problems present in the exchange of compensation for placing a child for adoption. The purposed 
framework eliminates the risks and dangers proffered by opponents of compensation for 
adoption by framing and limiting the compensation received to the same donations and services 
currently legally compensated for in ART, while still retaining the probable benefits realized by 
proponents of “parental rights selling”. Thus, the purposed framework will rid our legal system 
of a current prominent inequity, and achieve greater equality by granting women who place their 
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infants for adoption and women who participate in ART an equal opportunity for compensation 
for their comparable reproductive donations and services. 
Babies for Sale! 
 
Chief Justice Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme Court famously wrote, “There are, in a 
civilized society, some things that money cannot buy.”6 This is the argument of many opponents 
of “baby selling”. Margaret Radin, in her article, “What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby 
Selling?” highlights a more specific argument that because society has decided that it is simply 
not acceptable to sell human beings, it is equally unacceptable to treat babies as commodities and 
thus it is not acceptable to exchange money in adoption.
7 
In reality, “baby selling” is already 
taking place, both illegally and legally, in the various processes individuals utilize in order to 
have children.
8   
It occurs illegally or “quasi-illegally” when adoption agencies and intermediaries 
 
participate in black market compensation for adoption, and also in the “gray market” practice of 
baby brokering.
9 
It also occurs legally through ART, where women are compensated for 
donating their eggs and for serving as gestational surrogates, and men are compensated for 
donating their sperm. By acknowledging that compensation is already exchanged in adoption and 
that the risks and problems exist in an illegal black market, and by comparing the sacrifice of 
birth mothers to the reproductive donations and services compensated for in ART, it becomes 
exceedingly clear that birth mothers are being denied an equal opportunity to compensation for 
providing comparable reproductive materials and services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988). 
7 
Margaret Jane Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 Pac. L.J. 135, 136 (1995). See also 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 203, 204 
(2009). 
8 
Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 204. 
9 Id. 
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Public v. Private Adoption 
 
There are two systems of adoption in the United States: public adoptions and private 
adoptions. Public adoptions typically occur when the biological parent’s parental rights are 
terminated by a court, most likely due to an initial instance or pattern of abuse and neglect 
followed by failure to comply with court orders.
10 
In such circumstances, the child is usually 
placed in foster care and remains in the system until the family can be reunited or parental rights 
are terminated and the child is thus eligible for adoption. Public adoptions often involve older 
children, minorities and children with special needs.
11
 
Private adoptions are typically conducted through adoption agencies or by private 
 
intermediaries, and sometimes through a combination of both. Private adoption is often labeled 
“gray market” adoption, due to the lack of regulation on the parties involved and the methods 
and procedures utilized by those parties.
12 
In agency-facilitated adoptions, the birth parents 
relinquish their parental right to the adoption agency who then places the child with a 
prospective adoptive family.
13 
These agencies are state regulated and must be licensed by the 
state in order to legally facilitate adoptions.
14 
Prospective adoptive parents are screened by the 
adoption agencies and have to wait, on average, four to six years for a healthy infant to become 
available for adoption.
15 
There is a hierarchy in agency adoptions and prospective adoptive 
parents who are willing to adopt a child with special needs, a minority, or an older child increase 
their chances of receiving a child sooner and at a lesser cost.
16
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 230. 
11 
Id. 
12 Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 61. 
13 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, Wis. L. Rev. 1443, 1444, 1478-86 (1992). 
14 
Id. 
15 Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, at 1444, 1478-86. 
16 
Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1415, 1427 (2006). 
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Private adoption conjures up images of the popular 2007 comedy, Juno, where a quirky 
teenage girl finds herself saddled with an unwanted pregnancy and chooses adoptive parents for 
her unborn child out of a Penny Saver advertisement.
17 
This scenario does actually occur in 
private adoptions, but the process more often involves intermediaries, such as lawyers, doctors, 
or “baby brokers,” who are essentially individuals or organizations who facilitates private 
adoptions as a profession.
18 
In all private adoptions, the prospective parents are only legally 
allowed to compensate the birth mother for “pregnancy-related expenses.”19 The line between 
 
what qualifies as a pregnancy related expense can be ambiguous, which leads opponents of 
private adoptions to equate the process to baby-selling.
20 
Whereas payments for medical 
expenses, adoption agency fees, and attorney fees are arguably clearly pregnancy-related, the 
line starts to blur with payments for intermediary fees, living accommodations
21 
and payments to 
substitute for loss of employment income due to the pregnancy, such as in situations of doctor- 
ordered bed rest or where the birth mother’s employment is very labor intensive and unsafe for 
both the birth mother and the fetus.
22 
Opponents of allowing such fees argue that birth mothers 
are actually profiting from receiving money for these questionable pregnancy-related expenses, 
such as living expenses, and thus the concerns of baby selling regarding whether this transaction 
is truly voluntary and not due to the duress and pressures of financial desperation, are at issue.
23
 
Therefore, even in the legally condoned exchange of money in the adoption process, birth 
 
mothers are arguably currently being compensated for placing their infant for adoption. 
 
 
 
 
17 
JUNO (Fox Searchlights Pictures 2007). 
18 Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 207. 
19 Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, at 1443, 1444, 1478-86. 
20 Id. 
21 Carroll, Reregulating the Baby Market: A Call for A Ban on Payment of Birth-Mother Living Expenses, at 289. 
22 Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 235. 
23 Carroll, Reregulating the Baby Market: A Call for A Ban on Payment of Birth-Mother Living Expenses, at 289. 
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The demand for healthy infants leads numerous prospective adoptive parents and 
intermediaries to continue to blur the line of what constitutes legal pregnancy-related expenses, 
by doing whatever it takes to secure a child.
24 
Unscrupulous intermediaries prey on prospective 
adoptive parent’s desperation, enabling them to charge exorbitant fees for their services.25 These 
 
services include price setting and negotiation, matching birth parents with prospective adoptive 
parents based on both party’s requests and preferences, and arguably their most valuable function 
is providing a decrease in the risks inherent in adoption and a guarantee that the transaction will 
be a success.
26 
Intermediaries are able to decrease the inherent risks involved with adoption, such 
as the adoption falling through due to inexperienced price negotiation, because they are 
unregulated and thus have a monopoly on the expertise of such a transaction.
27 
Intermediaries 
lack of regulation also allows them to provide guarantees, such as, in their function of matching 
 
parties where they can adhere to specific requests for certain characteristics of prospective 
adoptive parents, and thus ensure a successful transaction.
28 
Not so surprisingly, these 
intermediaries are some of the strongest opponents of legalizing compensation to birth mothers, 
because once adoption compensation was legal and had appropriate procedures in place, then 
birth parents and prospective adoptive parents could easily engage in such transactions, either 
without the assistance of an intermediary, or with such assistance, but at a much lower cost.
29
 
These intermediaries would thus lose their majority stake in the profit.
30   
Therefore, if 
 
compensation for adoption was legalized, birth parents could also partake in the economic 
 
 
 
 
24 Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, at 1443, 1444, 1478-86. 
25 Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 235. 
26 Id. at 235-236. 
27 Id. at 236. 
28 Id. 
29 Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 249. 
30 Id. 
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benefit of the transaction, versus the intermediaries solely receiving the profit, with often nothing 
but their own interests in mind. 
Eggs and Sperm for Sale 
 
As the law stands today in the United States, women and men can exchange their eggs 
and sperm, the essential ingredients necessary to create a baby, for money. Although men can 
hypothetically walk into a sperm bank at any time and make “a donation,” woman undergo a 
much more pervasive process. Egg donation involves daily hormone injections for three to five 
weeks in order to stimulate the ovaries to produce multiple eggs, followed by minor surgery to 
extract the eggs.
31 
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s (hereinafter, “ASRM”) 
 
2007 Ethics Committee Report disallows greater compensation based on donor characteristics 
and places limits on the amount of compensation allowed by requiring justification for  “total 
payments to donors in excess of $5,000” and deems compensation above $10,000 as 
inappropriate.
32 
Numerous fertility websites cite their compliance with the ASRM under the 
compensation section of their website.
33
 
Despite these guidelines, many fertility clinics do offer compensation far greater than 
what the ASRM deems inappropriate, based on a number of factors including donor 
characteristics. There is a hierarchy of compensation for egg and sperm donations based on these 
factors and the donor’s characteristics. If a donor has blue eyes, high SAT scores, or graduated 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Reproductive Science Center of New Jersey, (Mar. 26, 2012, 10:00am) http://www.fertilitynj.com/egg- 
donor/egg-donor-information.html; see also Center for Human Reproduction – New York, (Mar. 26, 2012, 10:14am) 
http://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/egg_donor_faq.html. 
32  The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Compensation of Oocyte 
Donors, ASRM ETHICS COMMITTEE REPORT (2007), 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Reports_and_State 
ments/financial_incentives.pdf. 
33 Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, Egg Donor Agencies, (March 29, 2012, 2:05pm) 
http://www.sart.org/Egg_Donor_Agencies/. 
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from an Ivy League university, they can receive more money for their eggs or sperm than an 
individual with brown eyes who went to Rutgers University.
34
 
In 2007, a survey published in the Fertility and Sterility Journal documented the average 
rate of compensation at $4,217.
35 
That same year, Elite Donors, a company that specializes in 
personalized egg donor matching
36
, placed an advertisement in The Crimson, Harvard’s campus 
newspaper, offering $100,000 for donor eggs from Harvard’s female population.37 Elite Donors’ 
website advertises their latest search, conducted in January 2011, which accepted applications 
from women, “5’8 or taller in height, Caucasian (non Hispanic), naturally beautiful (modeling 
experience is a plus), 18-30 years old, college student or graduate, athletic (ideally college or 
professional level experience), and with no genetic medical issues.
38 
Selected applicants who 
donated their eggs were compensated $80,000 based on their innate characteristics.
39
 
 
Men are also paid more for their sperm based on similar factors. The national average 
compensation for sperm donations is $50, but men can be paid as high as $100 if they have an 
Ivy League degree.
40   
The “ideal sperm donor” is six feet tall, has blond or brown hair, blue or 
green eyes and a "medium" complexion.
41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, at 223. 
35 Roni Caryn Rabin, As Demand for Donor Eggs Soars, High Prices Stir Ethical Concerns, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(May 15, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/health/15cons.html. 
36 Elite Egg Donors, (April 22, 2012, 7:42pm) http://elitedonors.com/index5.html. 
37 Anyaegbunam, Ivy League women get offers for their eggs, http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2009/08/12/ivy-league- 
women-get-offers-for-their-eggs/. 
38 Elite Egg Donors, (April 22, 2012, 7:49pm) http://elitedonors.com/index3.html 
39 Id. 
40 Dr. Randi Hutter Epstein, Ivy League sperm: Do you have it?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:03am), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2300-204_162-10007254.html?tag=page. 
41 Id. 
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Surrogacy Compensation 
 
There are two forms of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy.
42 
In traditional 
surrogacy, the surrogate mother provides the donor egg as well as serves as the gestational 
surrogate, whereas with gestational surrogacy, the surrogate mother has no genetic relationship 
with the fetus and only serves as a gestational surrogate.
43 
In the famous case, In Re Baby M., the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey deemed traditional surrogacy contracts void, because 
compensation for adoption was illegal and such contracts too closely resembled baby selling.
44 
In 
Re Baby M. involved a traditional surrogacy agreement where the surrogate provided her own 
egg and was artificially inseminated with the contracting man’s sperm.45 Subsequent to the birth 
of the child, the surrogate, who was also the biological mother, changed her mind and refused to 
relinquish her parental rights.
46
 
The provisions of the surrogacy contract that particularly concerned the court in In Re 
Baby M., included the clause that granted $10,000 in compensation to the surrogate/biological 
mother, the clause that rescinded said compensation if the surrogate miscarried, and the fact that 
the biological father’s wife was not listed anywhere on the contract, which the Court found to be 
an attempt at making the transaction look less like baby selling.
47   
Many of the policy reasons 
behind the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding are also arguments of opponents of 
compensating birth mothers for adoption, such as the desire for children to be raised by their 
natural parents, preserving equal right-to-parent between the biological mother and father of the 
 
 
42 American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Third Party Reproduction, A Guide for Patients (Sperm, egg, and 
embryo donation and surrogacy), 3, 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ 
thirdparty.pdf 
43 Id. 
44  Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
45 Id. at 412. 
46 Id. at 414. 
47  Baby M, at 412, 422-425. 
12 
Jenny Beecroft 
 
child, and protecting a birth mother’s right to revoke consent. 48 These concerns are addressed in 
further detail under the “Safeguards” section of the paper. 
Gestational surrogacy is legal in some states, whereas other states refuse to recognize 
gestational surrogacy agreements as repugnant to public policy.
49 
With gestational surrogacy, the 
surrogate is implanted with an embryo, or multiple embryos, consisting of the contracting 
couple’s egg and sperm, donor egg and sperm, or a combination of both.50 Surrogates can be 
compensated from $80,000 to $100,000.
51
 
Some opponents of ART argue that ART has contributed toward the decrease in adoption 
rates due to its ability to satisfy prospective parent’s desire for genetic children, even when their 
faced with infertility.
52 
On the other hand, the argument can also be made that the ability to have 
genetic offspring is just one factor that leads infertile couples to turn to ART in their effort to 
have a child, and that prospective parents favor ART to the adoption process due to a number of 
reasons, including the reality that it takes less time to receive a child through ART then through 
adoption.
53 
On average it takes only one to two years to conceive a child through surrogacy, 
while it can take four to six years to obtain an infant through private adoption.
54 
Thus, it could be 
 
reasoned that if compensation was legalized in adoption, the adoption process would speed up 
 
 
48 Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of 
Children?, 26 Whittier L. Rev. 429, 480 (2004). 
49 The Human Rights Campaign (February 20, 2012, 11:02pm), http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/state 
50 American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Third Party Reproduction, A Guide for Patients (Sperm, egg, and 
embryo donation and surrogacy), 3, 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ 
thirdparty.pdf 
51 Saul, Building a Baby, With Few Ground Rules, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?pagewanted=2&ref=assistedreproductivetech nology. 
52 Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics of Adoption & Reproduction, 2 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 5, 
9-10 (1995). 
53 Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance over Ivf? Issues and Options, 22 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 1215, 1219 
(1997). 
54 Northeast Assisted Fertility Group, Surrogacy Frequently Asked Questions (March 29, 2010, 9:22am), 
http://www.assistedfertility.com/faqs/faq-surrogacy.shtml. 
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significantly due to the increased supply of infants available placed for adoption, and this would 
result in placing adoption on a more level playing field with ART, in terms of attractiveness to 
would-be-parents. 
 S ell in g  “Paren tal  Righ t s ,”  Not Babies 
 
Judge Richard Posner has infamously argued, that legalizing compensation for adoption is 
not “baby selling” but merely “parental rights selling.”55 Posner relied on the fact that 
compensation is already exchanged in adoption to advocate for an experiment that could result in 
increased “efficiency and equability” as a result of legalizing and thus regulating the transactions 
that already take place.
56   
Whereas Posner’s intent was to address the uneven level of supply and 
demand in the adoption market, this paper seeks to tackle the imbalance of rights granted to birth 
mothers who relinquish their infants for adoption, as opposed to egg donors and gestational 
surrogates.
57 
This is not to say that there would not be indirect benefits of equalizing these rights, 
similar to the benefits predicted by Posner in his theory, and these benefits would also come 
without the risks that intrinsically exist when a monetary value is placed on an intangible 
priceless right. 
58
 
Black Market vs. Free Market 
 
The black market is inherently illegal.
59 
Compensation for adoption, not related to pregnancy 
expenses, is illegal in every state, therefore any adoption transactions where the birth mother is 
compensated for anything beyond pregnancy related expenses is illegal and was performed on 
the “black market.” The effect of the illegality of the black market is that it is not regulated and 
 
the lack of regulation leads to exorbitant costs and prices, which would normally be lowered by 
 
55 
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 63. 
56 Id. at 61 
57 Id. at 61. 
58 Id. at 61. 
59 Id. at 62. 
14 
Jenny Beecroft 
 
the competition that naturally exists in a free market.
60 
Posner’s theory essentially argues that 
legalizing the sale of parental rights would allow for a free market and thus eliminate the 
unnaturally high prices that run ramped in grey and black market adoptions that are presently 
occurring under the existing framework. 
61   
Currently, compensating a birth mother in order to 
secure an adoption can run very steep because the transaction is performed on the black market 
and thus it is not subject to regulation.
62 
The regulation, safeguards, and competition that exist in 
a free market would have the effect of bringing prices down.
63
 
 
Posner counters arguments that a free market for adoption would lead to a system of adoption 
where only the rich would be able to adopt, by noting that adoption is already relatively 
expensive and is not necessarily accessibly to everyone.
64 
Legal adoptions performed by state 
 
regulated and licensed adoption agencies presently favor “wealthy and well-connected” 
prospective adoptive parents.
65 
Posner believes the competition that naturally exists in a free 
market would actually lower the costs of adoption, and therefore adoption would become more, 
not less, accessible to the general population.
66
 
Treating Women and Children as Commodities? 
Margaret Radin, in her article “What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?”, 
acknowledges the argument that by allowing a free market on adoption, society is condoning 
treating women, birth mother’s specifically, as commodities in the sense that those with blue 
eyes, athletic ability, high SAT scores, and Ivy League educations will be able to demand a 
 
 
 
 
60 
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 62. 
61 
Id. at 63. 
62 
Id. 
63 
Id. 
64 
Id. 
65 
Id. at 62. 
66 
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 62. 
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higher price for relinquishing their infants.
67 
Yet, this argument fails to acknowledge that the 
ability to demand a higher price already legally exists in the market for donor eggs. A simple 
Google search for “egg donor” produces a list of websites, the first titling in bold letters on their 
egg donor application form: “Welcome Smart Beautiful Healthy Egg Donors.”68 If society 
condones such treatment of women as commodities in the donor egg market, logically, they 
would condone the same to an adoptive mother that is simply serving as the egg donor and a 
surrogate for a family seeking to have a child. 
Radin also acknowledges the same argument but focusing not on the birth mothers, but on 
the infants who are subsequently adopted with the use of compensation.
69 
Specifically, that this 
would be treating children as commodities by making them feel that they are only worth the 
price they were paid, and if their neighbor down the street “cost more,” he is worth more.70 In 
reality, paying more for children based on certain characteristics is already legally occurring in 
the United States today.
71 
Adoption agencies charge more for white babies, less for Latino, 
Native American and Asian babies, and the least for biracial and African American babies.
72
 
Opponents also argue that if infant adoptions become more available and accessible to the 
general public, that this will have the negative effect of decreasing the number of public 
adoptions that take place.
73 
Posner strikes down arguments that free market effects will lower the 
rate of public adoptions, by highlighting that they will be free, and thus maintain a desirable 
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characteristic in a free market.
74 
Certainly, it is much easier and less expensive to adopt some 
children over others under today’s current framework, and this has not abolished the practice of 
public adoptions.
75
 
The Benefits of the Domino Effect 
 
Posner suggests other benefits would result as well as greater availability and accessibility to 
infant adoptions, including decreased abortion rates, increased supply of infants placed for 
adoption, and thus much more efficient and particularly quicker placement rates then prospective 
adoptive parents currently endure.
76 
Historically, when a woman encountered an unwanted 
pregnancy she had two options: keep the baby or give it up for adoption.
77 
Subsequent to the 
 
Supreme Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade, a woman now has the right to choose to have an 
abortion and terminate her pregnancy.
78 
Posner suggests the right to abortion has decreased the 
number of babies placed for adoption, and if given the incentive of compensation, women who 
become faced with an unwanted pregnancy might choose adoption over abortion.
79
 
The typical profile of a birth mother who chooses adoption over parenting is a white teenager 
with aspirations of higher education and long-term career goals.
80 
It is easy to imagine the 
scenario where a high school or college student, with a promising future ahead of her, encounters 
an unwanted pregnancy. As the law currently stands, her options are to, in effect, donate her 
child out of pure altruism and receive no other benefit for her sacrifice, or to procure an abortion 
 
 
 
74 Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 63. 
75 Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, at 1427. 
76 Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 63. 
77 Id. at 63. 
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where she will have to undergo minimal negative repercussions, all moral beliefs and ensuing 
implications aside. If the student chooses to continue her pregnancy and give her child up for 
adoption, she is subjecting herself to countless direct and indirect adverse effects. 
For nine months her life is no longer her own: she has to be conscious of everything she puts 
in her body, cannot drink alcohol, cannot smoke and cannot eat certain foods.
81 
She is also 
putting her own health and even life at risk, although advances in medicine have greatly reduced 
the risk of health implications and death due to pregnancy and childbirth.
82 
Despite the fact that 
the supermodels and celebrities pictured in the tabloid magazines she reads seem to bounce back 
to their pre-pregnancy self in a matter of days, the reality is that the physical structure of her 
body may never recover from the stresses and strains inflicted by pregnancy.
83   
The pregnancy 
may also have negative effects on her education and ability to procure future employment or 
continue her education in graduate studies. 
Not diminishing any of the previously mentioned sacrifices, the focus of this paper is the 
sacrifice she will make if she places her infant for adoption.  She is in effect donating her genetic 
material in the form of her egg that co-created the fetus, and she is providing the gestational 
surrogate service in the process of carrying the fetus to term. Yet, for these sacrifices she is 
illegible to receive only the good feeling that inhibits someone who performs an altruistic act for 
no benefit of their own. On the other hand, if she chooses to have an abortion she will likely 
experience some discomfort during the procedure and a certain sense of loss and sadness in the 
moments and days following, but arguably nothing comparable to the adverse effects she would 
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endure by opting for adoption. Many egg donors concede that although altruism plaid a role in 
their decision to become an egg donor, they would not have donated their eggs, had it not been 
for the benefit of compensation.
84 
Therefore, if women were compensated for their reproductive 
donations and services in adoption it could induce them to continue pregnancies they otherwise 
would have terminated. Thus, the component of compensation would equalize the costs and 
benefits of a women’s choice between adoption and abortion. 
Like Taking Candy From A Baby? 
 
Opponents of compensation for adoption argue that the inducement of compensation will 
create that risks that these adoptions will not be truly voluntary and will result in young, poor, 
and specifically minority women, being taken advantage of. This is based on the reasoning that 
women who exhibit these characteristics cannot negotiate at arms length, because they are more 
susceptible to coercion and duress as a result of their economic hardship.
85 
Vanessa Browne- 
Barbour, in her article “Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests 
 
of Children?” argues that, given the fact that racial minorities make up the majority of the “poor 
and disadvantaged class,” allowing for the sale of their parental rights will basically be creating a 
system of “reproductive slavery,” where disadvantaged minority women are “pressured” into 
having babies for wealthy, affluent, Caucasian women.
86
 
To counter Browne-Barbour’s theory, the argument could be made that the population she 
focuses on: poor, disadvantaged and minority women, are not likely to be swayed by the 
prospect of compensation for reproductive services, as they are not the typical population that 
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chooses to place their infants for adoption.
87 
The typical profile of a woman who chooses 
adoption for her infant is a Caucasian teenager or young adult under the age of twenty-one, who 
resides with her well-educated parents in a middle to upper-class suburban neighborhood.
88 
The 
population of disadvantaged minority women that Browne-Barbour is fearful for, do not 
typically chose adoption over parentage.
89 
Therefore, if any population were to become more 
susceptible to the inducement of compensation, it would more likely be the population of white 
teenagers from economically stable, educated homes, since they are already more prone to 
choosing adoption over parentage. 
To be sure, the potential risk does exist that the incentive of compensation could cause some 
women in economic duress to place their infants for adoption “involuntarily”. The purposed 
framework takes this risk into account and limits the amount of compensation to what the 
particular women would have received had she donated her eggs and served as a gestational 
surrogate. This limitation is in contrast to other theories that choose to frame the exchange as 
compensation exchanged for parental rights. Parental rights are fundamental rights in our society 
and our legal system
90
, and thus are arguably intangible and priceless, and therefore much more 
susceptible to inflated compensation, which would more readily lend itself to the risk of 
procurement due to economic duress. By framing and limiting compensation to reproductive 
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services, many of the risks of undue economic distress and therefore involuntary 
relinquishments, are greatly reduced. 
Thus, the proposed framework would limit compensation to reproductive services that are 
already legally compensated for today. By limiting compensation in this manner, the purposed 
framework would not entice anyone who is set on parentage to waiver in that decision and 
consider adoption, merely due to the possibility of compensation. Such compensation would only 
serve as an incentive to those who do not want to parent, to choose adoption over abortion. 
This is not to ignore the plausible scenario where the compensation indirectly creates the 
ability for the birth mother to properly raise and care for the child later in life, and thus regret 
choosing adoption. For example, imagine a birth mother is compensated for her donation and 
reproductive services, thus allowing her to pay for college, establish a career and become 
financially secure ten years later. The possibility does exist that women who use the 
compensation received from adoption toward furthering their education and broadening their 
opportunities in life will later have some regret for their previous relinquishment once they can 
afford to properly care for their biological child. The reality is that such potential for regret 
already exists under today’s legal framework, and the only component the purposed legal 
framework would change is that it would create this opportunity for women to further their 
educations or similar life goals.  Regrets are an inevitable risk regardless of whether 
compensation is involved in the equation, and at least under the purposed framework there are 
potential benefits due to the added component of compensation. 
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The Slippery Slope: Baby Selling to Organ Selling and Beyond 
 
It is illegal to sell human organs in the United States today.
91 
Opponents of compensation 
for adoption rely on society’s decision not to allow the sale of human organs in arguing that if 
compensation is exchanged in adoption, this will blur the line and inevitably lead society down 
the slippery slope toward selling human organs.
92 
The purposed framework is not suggesting that 
we legalize actually selling human infants, but instead limits compensation to a woman’s 
reproductive donations and services. As previously discussed, compensation is legal for egg 
donation and gestational surrogacy. This is not to suggest that simply because the law condones 
something, that is should automatically condone comparable acts. The purpose is to demonstrate 
that by limiting compensation to what is already legally practiced, is feasible and arguably not 
detrimental to society, that many of the risks proposed by opponents of compensation in 
adoption will not occur in a legally regulated market. 
 
Opponents of compensation in adoption rely on similar reasoning behind the laws 
prohibiting the sale of human organs. Such opponents argue that analogous risks apply in both 
exchanges. For example, there is the argument that if human organs were available for purchase 
and sale on the open market, that abduction and illegal trafficking to obtain these organs would 
skyrocket.
93 
This argument ignores the regulation that would go hand-in-hand with a free market, 
which would reduce the risks of abduction and illegal trafficking of human organs that occurs on 
the black market today.
94 
The same logic could apply to an adoption market. Once taken out of 
the black market, legal compensation for adoption and the regulation that ensues would actually 
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prevent such concerns as abduction and trafficking of infants, because birth mothers and 
prospective adoptive parents will be able to freely contract in the open, under clear regulations 
and safeguards, thus eliminating the black market and the inherent dangers that thrive in such a 
market.
95
 
Further, the risks of abduction and human trafficking in a market for adoption are 
 
arguably not akin to what is present in a market for human organs, because the need for human 
organs is life or death.
96 
Such high-stake desperation that is prominent in the face of death 
simply does not exist in an adoption market.
97 
Even more so, under the purposed framework, 
women are limited to compensation for their reproductive services, which arguably would make 
infants less prone to abduction and trafficking, because desperate prospective parents who may 
be prone to participating in the black market, would be able to pay for a women’s reproductive 
services on the free market to procure an adoption. 
Suggested Framework and Safeguards 
 
Framework 
 
Parental Rights Selling vs. Compensation for Egg Donation and Gestational Surrogacy 
 
Posner argues that parental rights, versus actual babies, are exchanged for compensation 
in an adoption market.
98 
Although Posner’s proposal does an exemplary job of framing an 
adoption market in a free market versus black market for opponents who argue from that vacuum 
when proffering risks, his proposal fails in that many of the dangers that exist in the black market 
would continue to exist under his “parental rights selling” theory. This is due to the fact that 
 
 
 
 
95 Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 63. 
96 Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, at 145. 
97 Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, at 145 (discussing the risk of 
trafficking and abduction are not similarly present in Oocytes as they are in human organs). 
98 Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, at 63. 
23 
Jenny Beecroft 
 
parental rights are intangible, priceless, and fundamental rights.
99 
Such a valuable “item” 
available for exchange would arguably be just as susceptible to inflated prices as compensation 
for adoption currently is on the black market. Posner counters exclamations of such risks by 
arguing that the competition inherently present in a free market will drive prices down. Yet, even 
in a free market, commodities that are placed on pedestal and viewed by society as priceless, 
such as artwork, still manage to achieve astronomical and unattainable (at least to the general 
population) prices. 
These readily drawn conclusions run directly counter to Posner’s allegation that a free 
market on adoption would make it more accessible. To be sure, if there is an increase in the 
amount of infants placed for adoption, arguably Posner’s theory is correct and such adoptions 
will become more accessible then they are currently. But if the cost of obtaining an infant 
adoption is similar to the cost of a “priceless artwork” then only the rich and affluent will be able 
to cough up the hundreds of thousands of dollars, possibly millions, to participate in such a 
market. The inflated prices will continue to cause desperate potential adoptive parents to go to 
extreme means, such as using unscrupulous intermediaries to obtain infants, whether it be 
abduction, human trafficking or preying on an unknowing, disadvantaged teenager. Thus, the 
risks and dangers of the black market will still thrive under Posner’s proposal. 
Placing a price on parental rights poses too many risks that clearly outweigh the proposed 
benefits, such as the result of an increased supply of babies available for adoption.
100 
This paper 
proposes a new framework where women are compensated for their reproductive services, not 
their parental rights.  Under the proposed framework a birth mother would merely be 
compensated for providing her egg and her services as a gestational surrogate, as would an egg 
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donor and surrogate in a similar situation. Many of the same benefits, such as an increase in the 
number of infants placed for adoption, proffered in Posner’s “parental rights selling” theory can 
be achieved without the risks of inflated costs, by providing a equitable framework that 
encourages the choice of adoption by granting birth mothers the same right to compensation as 
those who participate in ART. 
“Similar circumstances to an egg donor or surrogate” refers to the attributes and 
characteristics innately found in the birth mother, and how she would be compensated in the 
same fashion as an egg donor or a surrogate for possessing such desirable traits.  For example, if 
the birth mother has blue eyes and a degree from Harvard she may be compensated more for her 
donation and services which she provided in the adoption process, then a birth mother who did 
not attend college and scored poorly on the SATs. To reiterate, this paper is not attempting to 
criticize or condone these processes that are already in place, but is instead seeking equality for 
birth mothers of adopted infants who are sacrificing equally, if not more, then egg donors and 
gestational surrogates. 
Don’t  Throw  the  Bab y  O ut  W it h  The  Bathwater  
 
The fact that compensation is already exchanged in the process of obtaining an adoption 
is insufficient justification to continue to deny birth mothers a right to equal compensation for 
their reproductive donation and service. The reason for illustrating how compensation for 
adoption is presently occurring in society today is to highlight that such exchanges are taking 
place in a black market due to the fact that compensation for adoption is illegal, and thus any 
compensation exchanged for adoption will not be regulated under the law. Therefore, the risks 
and concerns opponents proffer only apply to the illegal exchange of compensation for adoption, 
not the suggested legal exchange, that would logically be subject to strict regulations that 
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provide for safeguards to prevent the risks and harms that ran rampant in the illegal market. As 
Posner argues, the risks and cons are being proffered in the vacuum of the black market and thus 
are not necessarily applicable to a purposed legal framework.
101 
If legalized, the purposed 
framework would be regulated subject to the practices and price setting of the current market of 
reproductive donations and services. In addition to price regulation, additional safeguards will be 
put in place to insure the voluntary nature of the transaction and to eliminate other potential 
risks. 
 
The regulation of the exchange of compensation also raises the question of who would be 
responsible for such regulation. Currently adoptions are regulated state-by-state.
102 
An issue of 
state-by-state regulation arises when compensation is added to the picture because then adoptions 
become commerce.
103 
Due to the fast paced, high-tech society we live in today, travel is readily 
accessible to the general public. These adoptions will most definitely occur across state lines, 
with money exchanged from one state to another and could thus be subject to federal regulation 
under interstate commerce.
104 
Ideally, Congress would set the minimum acceptable standards 
and implement required minimal safeguards and states could then employ agencies to carry out 
the day-to-day aspects of the regulation based on Congress’s requirements.105   Such regulation 
by congress would not be the first time the federal government utilized their power to regulate 
interstate family activity, such as child support and child abuse prevention, under “its spending 
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and commerce powers under Article I, its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article 
IV, and its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” to delve into the 
area of family law historically left to the states.
106 
Cooperation and co-management between the 
federal and state governments would ensure a uniform minimum standard of regulation and 
safeguards that would be followed by all states and yet would still allow for individual states to 
implement stricter regulations or heightened safeguards where they determine is necessary in 
their particular state. 
 
Splitting the Baby 
 
Assuming, for arguments sake, that it is permissible for a biological mother to give up her 
child for adoption and receive compensation for her reproductive donation and service, the 
question then arises of who should receive compensation. It takes sperm and an egg to create an 
embryo and subsequently a fetus, thus it takes a woman and a man to make a baby. Therefore, 
men should be compensated for their reproductive donation as well, just as a sperm donor would 
in similar and like circumstances. 
The birth mother is essentially providing “the donor egg” and providing her services as a 
 
surrogate so it follows that she could be compensated anywhere from $25,000 to $300,000 (up to 
$200,000 for serving as a surrogate and up to $100,000 for donating her eggs) in return for her 
donation and services as a surrogate.
107 
The biological father is comparable to a sperm donor and 
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thus should receive $40 to $100 for his donation, depending on certain innate characteristics and 
educational pedigree, as a sperm donor would in similar and like circumstances.
108
 
Although these prices may seem high, adoption for a healthy Caucasian infant cost up to 
 
$35,000 currently.
109 
As similarly enumerated in Posner’s theory, compensating birth mothers 
for their donation and services in the adoption process could induce more women to forgo 
abortions and choose adoption. This could then result in an increase in the availability of infants 
placed for and thus available for adoption. The purposed framework’s indirect benefits could 
create a much quicker process to procure an infant to adoption, due to their increased 
availability, which would thus make a marginally greater cost worth it to the majority of couples 
who wait four to six years for a healthy infant to become available for adoption. Also, families 
without the means to adopt an infant will still be able to adopt, as the adoption system will 
remain the same as it is today for all children old enough to leave the hospital. 
Another consideration if biological fathers are to be compensated for providing their 
sperm in the adoption process, is notice. Currently, if not married to the biological mother and 
not named on the child’s birth certificate, in order for a man to receive notice that his biological 
child is being placed for adoption, the biological father has to register with the state’s putative 
father registry.
110 
The same procedure and requirements could continue and along with receiving 
 
notice, the biological father could receive details on collecting compensation for his reproductive 
donation in the event he consents to the adoption. If the potential biological father does not 
register then he will not receive notice and will be ineligible for compensation, regardless of 
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whether he finds out about the adoption at a later date, just as he would not be ineligible to 
contest an adoption today if he found out it occurred a year ago without his knowledge. 
This would not only encourage more men to register with the putative father registry, 
thus eliminating many of the problems that arise due to fathers discovering their biological 
children’s placement for adoption after its too late, but it would also encourage improvements in 
the system itself. As it stands, the putative father registry is run state-by-state. The implications 
of state-by-state management of the putative father registry, in the era we live in where everyone 
travels and moves from state-to-state frequently, is that it is highly unlikely that even if a man 
registers in the state where he had sexual intercourse or where the biological mother lives or 
lived when the sexual intercourse occurred, that he will have registered in the “correct” putative 
father registry and in fact receive notice of an impending adoption. If the putative father registry 
was national on the other hand, potential biological fathers could register, be located, and given 
notice of adoption proceedings much more efficiently and effectively. 
The potential downside to compensating biological fathers for their reproductive services 
is that it could provide further incentive for birth mothers to refuse to reveal the biological 
father’s identity.111 Providing compensation to both the birth mother and the biological father 
arguably prevents an incentive to conceal the biological father’s identity. Although the birth 
mother obviously receives a much greater percentage, both levels of compensation will be based 
on the relative amount of compensation they would receive if they were participating in ART. 
Therefore, the purposed framework remains feasible with minimal risks while providing 
compensation for all parties who contribute donations and provide reproductive services. 
Safeguards 
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 “Gre at  Inter ests  Demand  Great  S af e 
guards ”  112 
 
The recommended safeguards would include counseling for the birth mother, attorneys 
for all parties involved, and time limits and constraints on when the relinquishment must occur. 
In order to prevent the outright sale of human beings compensation may not be exchanged once 
the mother leaves the hospital. The birth mother must decide that she is placing her infant for 
adoption before she is released from the hospital in order to be eligible to receive compensation 
for her reproductive services and donations. Although it can be argued that due to hormones and 
the prominent possibility of post-partum depression, some women may not be able to make 
rational decisions immediately following giving birth, the risks of not drawing a firm time limit 
on relinquishment too greatly lend themselves toward actually selling human beings. Imagine if 
the time constraint was relaxed and birth mothers had up to three months to make the decision to 
place the child for adoption and still be eligible to receive compensation for their reproductive 
services. The decision to relinquish parental rights for compensation after parenting a child for 
three months, even if disguised under the label of “compensation for reproductive services” will 
have the appearance of baby selling, which would destroy the legitimacy of the entire framework 
rendering it unfeasible. 
The subsequent safeguards discussed seek to eliminate that risks of drawing such a firm 
relinquishment time line by ensuring that the birthmother is making an informed, voluntary 
decision. For example, a recommended safeguard would be that all parties: the birth mother, 
biological father, and prospective adoptive parents; must have separate and independent legal 
counsel to ensure that everyone’s separate rights and interests are adequately protected. Along 
those same lines, an additional safeguard to protect any potential for involuntary relinquishment 
 
 
 
 
112 Quote by Thomas Francis Meagher. 
30 
Jenny Beecroft 
 
and ensure that the decision is not one solely due to economic distress, would be to require the 
birth mothers participation in mandatory counseling with an independent counselor throughout 
her pregnancy, and at a minimum, weekly during her last semester. The age of the birth mother 
will not ban her from compensation as the mandatory counseling and access to independent legal 
counsel would provide sufficient safeguards against the possible immaturity and lack of full 
comprehension in all the aspects and effects of her decision. 
The term “independent” regarding the attorneys and counselor refers to the fact that an 
independent attorney and an independent counselor cannot be provided by the adoptive parents 
or by an adoption agency or intermediary, but instead must be completely unconnected to all 
parties involved. Thus the counselor and attorney for each party will have only the best interest 
of their patient and child in mind. Compensation will not be exchanged if either the attorney or 
counselor determines that this is not a voluntary transaction, such as the determination that the 
adoption is due to the mother being forced against her will or pressured by undue duress such as 
financial distress. Any adoption transaction will be deemed void upon any showing of 
involuntary relinquishment by the birth mother. 
In sum, only birth mothers that relinquish their infants before leaving the hospital, attend 
the required counseling during their pregnancy, and consult with independent counsel, will be 
eligible to receive compensation for their reproductive donations and services. The above 
safeguards will prevent many of the risks proffered by opponents of compensation for adoption 
including involuntary relinquishment due to economic distress and the risk of crossing the line to 
selling human beings. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, women who provide reproductive donations and services, such as egg 
donation and gestational surrogacy should be compensated. Women should have an equal 
opportunity to such compensation regardless of whether they are an egg donor, a gestational 
surrogate or a birth mother of an infant placed for adoption. In addition to justice and equality 
being served as a result of such an equalization of rights, the indirect benefits such as a decrease 
in the abortion rate and thus increase in the amount of infants placed for adoption will improve 
the current system where prospective adoptive parents wait up to six years to obtain an infant 
through adoption. The risks, such as economic duress leading to involuntary relinquishments, 
will be preempted by the regulations and safeguards that will be put in place under the proposed 
framework, such as the requirement for independent counsel for all parties involved as well as 
the requirement of mandatory counseling for the birth mother throughout her pregnancy. The 
purposed system will reap all of the benefits while eliminating the costs and risks of previous 
attempts at creating an adoption market. 
